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Like social predictions also advices addressed to the relevant agents may influence their subject and consequently may 
be liable to self-referentiality effects. It is a well-known phenomenon that decisionmakers tend to delay the execution of 
a given advice the more the less urgent the underpinning arguments appear to be to them. Particularly, this can be 
observed in economic and in environmental policy. What should a professional adviser do? It is the purpose of this 
study to provide an analytical framework in which a professional adviser's objectives are analyzed. Naturally, his first 
objective is to choose such an advice and such underpinning arguments that the advice really will be taken by the 
addressed agents (argument justification objective). This is closely related to the problem of the predictability of social 
events which for the first time has rigorously been analyzed by Grunberg and Modigliani in 1954. The adviser's second 
objective of being right with his underpinning arguments and his third objective, i.e. his potential self-interest in the 
ultimate outcome, will be taken into account in this study by means of a subjective utility function. This approach can 
be seen as complementary to the literature on strategic information transmission and credibility. 
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It is a commonly known phenomenon in social reality that decisionmakers
tend to delay the execution of a given advice when it involves same uncom-
fortableness to them. If, in addition, the advice is underpinned by some
arguments, the delay usually is the greater the less important and urgent the
arguments appear to be. Facing such a delaying reaction regime the adviser
encounters economic problems if he has own objectives. Actually, there are
several reasonable objectives for a professional adviser: ﬁrst of all he may
strive for both that his advice will be taken by the target group and that
his arguments will turn out to be correct. (The latter clearly means that he
will give that argument which he considers to have the greatest probability
of coming true.) Or, he may, willy-nilly, give priority to one of these two
sub-objectives if they are not achievable at the same time. Or, he may even
have in mind some other criterions determining a certain set of actions from
which he desires the target group to make her choice. The adviser’s moti-
vation for the ﬁrst objective is obvious: if he achieves it, he proves both to
be successful in social aﬀairs and to be well-versed in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of the
subject. Clearly, for a professional adviser his public reputation is of vital
interest. Thus, the ﬁrst objective will be called the adviser’s social reputation
objective. The last objective, on the other hand, can naturally be formalized
by utility maximization through the adviser: the set of desired actions is
formed by the maximizers of the adviser’s subjective utility function. It ap-
pears to be reasonable to assume that the utility criterion is a mixture of the
ﬁrst objective and the adviser’s potential self-interest in the ﬁnal outcome.
Examples for this occur in the relationship between a consulting ﬁrm
or an internal expert panel and the management of a ﬁrm, or in the relation-
ships between an economic expert committee and the government, between
advisory boards and executive councils of the European Community, or be-
tween disarmament negotiators and their governments when in the eyes of
their governments they are going too far. Another ﬁeld to which the pre-
ceding characterization particularly applies is that of environmental policy.
Here the adviser for instance may be an oﬃcial committee of experts, a pri-
vate person, a political party or a group of members of parliament. The
target group may be the local, national or international legislature, a branch
of industry or commerce, or a group of consumers. Naturally, advisers will
strive for the ﬁrst objective addressed above in order to be taken seriously in
future. In addition to that, however, advisers usually also have a self-interest
in the ultimate outcome. A delaying reaction behaviour by the target group
in dependence on the urgency of arguments is, for instance, well-known from
advices which require protective measures, more rigorous limiting values of
1pollutants, incentives for activities which are beneﬁcial to the environment,
or voluntary self-restriction in certain production and consumption activities.
Examples of topics in the public eye where this can be particularly observed
are the destruction of the global ozone layer through propellants and produc-
tion of coolants and foam materials, air pollution and pollution of rivers and
seas, especially of the North Sea, the risk of radioactive contamination, ani-
mals tests, cutting down and dying of forests, toxic waste, polluted food and
conservation, especially protection of species. Actually the delaying sched-
ules passed by international conferences on the ozone layer problem and on
the pollution of the North Sea speak for themselves.
Representing advices and arguments on one-dimensional scales in Sec-
tion 2 the characterized reaction behaviour of the target group is analyti-
cally formalized in an intuitive way by a reaction function which is a ﬁber-
preserving (or ﬁberwise) map from a subspace ˜ S1 × ˜ S1 of the torus into the
torus. The ﬁrst factor ˜ S1, the so-called base space, represents the arguments,
whereas the advices and the ultimate outcome are represented by the points
of the second factor ˜ S1, the so-called ﬁber space. The advantages of the
representation on the torus will become clear in Proposition 2 in Section 2.
As it has been pointed out, the social reputation objective clearly plays a
crucial role. However, there is the diﬃculty that its two sub-objectives in
general are unlikely to be achievable at the same time. Obviously, the one
sub-objective of being right with one’s argument no matter whether the ad-
vice is taken, or not, is speciﬁcally related to the nature of the subject of
the respective matter under consideration. Thus, the second Section will be
mainly concerned with the other sub-objective of argument justiﬁcation, i.e.,
choosing an advice which will be taken by the target group no matter which
argument is needed for it. Actually, the argument justiﬁcation sub-objective
is reasonable for the adviser: if the execution of his advice is delayed he does
not prove to be able to assert himself with the target group. If it is exceeded
he risks to appear to be useless at all.
One may naturalIy be interested in suﬃcient conditions for the exis-
tence of a solution to the argument justiﬁcation objective in the presented
analytical framework. Section 2 provides several results of increasing gener-
ality. The solutions to the argument justiﬁcation objective just turn out to
be the ﬁxed points of the addressed reaction function. Actually, only an ele-
mentary ﬁxed point result is needed, namely the Intermediate Value Theorem
which is one of the fundamental principles of mathematics.
The analysis is further extended to the question when an arbitrarily
picked advice really will be taken by the target group. For this the re-
presentation using the torus ˜ S1 × ˜ S1 turns out to be useful: it allows for
generalization and uniﬁcation. The main result of Section 2 is contained in
2Proposition 2. Integrating the diverging objectives by maximizing a subjec-
tive utility function will be the theme of Section 3. All proofs are intuitive
and elementary in that they rely on the Intermediate Value Theorem.
In a general context the argument justiﬁcation objective has been called
”the opportunistic principle” by B¨ oge, 1974. The reason for this is that it,
oversubtly, can be interpreted as just talking up to the target group. A
famous example for this can be found in Saint-Exupery’s novel ”The Little
Prince” in the King of the Asteroid: The King deliberately only orders his
subjects to do what they anyway are just going to do. In eﬀect, all orders
by the king are always obeyed by his subjects.
Obviously, the problem of argument justiﬁcation in advising is inti-
mately related to the well-known problem of giving accurate public forecasts
when the subject of the forecast is inﬂuenced by the forecast itself (”self-
referential”, or ”reﬂexive forecasts”, ”forecasting with feedbacks”). The is-
sue of self-referentiality in social predictions has been of major interest in
economics since O. Morgenstern’s pioneering study on the subject in 1928.
In their path-breaking paper from 1954 Grunberg and Modigliani for the
ﬁrst time provided a rigorous existence analysis using Brouwer’s Fixed Point
Theorem. In the sequel there had been given further extensions and appli-
cations in the literature using various model frameworks (e.g. Devletoglou,
1961; Rothschild, 1964; Galatin, 1976; Jordan, 1980, and in particular the
controversy by Kemp, Chiang, and Grunberg/Modigliani in the American
Economic Review 1961/1962). Actually, the present study is in the tra-
dition of Grunberg and Modigliani in that it uses a continuous reaction
function of the decision-makers as a primitive concept. A survey on the-
oretical and applied literature on the topic can be found in Tamborini, 1997;
G¨ uth and Kliemt, 2004; Lehmann-Waﬀenschmidt, 1990, 1996; and Lehmann-
Waﬀenschmidt and Sandri, 2006. Actually, there has also been major interest
in this topic by other social sciences, for instance concerning election forecast
or opinion research, and by philosophy for the methodological aspects (e.g.
Stewart, 1975; Henshel, 1978).
There is another branch in game theoretical literature which is closely
related to our approach (e.g. Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts,
1982; Wilson, 1985 for a survey). These studies investigate the sequential
strategic interactions between an adviser whose motives are uncertain (a
”spy”, or a ”double agent”) and a decisionmaker (a ”representative of govern-
ment”). In this context, it pays for an unfriendly adviser to build a reputation
(credibility) by providing accurate and valuable information and performing
useful services, and eventually to cash in on his reputation. However, the
concern of this approach is diﬀerent from ours as we analyse the situation
of a professional adviser who never may aﬀord of entirely cashing in on his
3reputation. In this sense the two approaches may well be viewed as being
complementary to each other.
2 The Argument Justiﬁcation Objective
This Section provides a formal model for analyzing the adviser’s argument
justiﬁcation objective. Furthermore, it presents same results concerning the
existence of solutions to this objective.
As already has been argued in the Introduction, the adviser’s objective
of argument justiﬁcation is reasonable because otherwise he would damage his
reputation: in the case of a delaying reaction behaviour the adviser does not
assert himself with the target group, and in the case of an exceeding reaction
behaviour he risks to appear to be useless. As it has been mentioned already,
geometric intuition will be a good guide throughout the whole Section.
Let us start with the following heuristics. Think of a certain social
problem for which the necessary measures are well-known through scientiﬁc
work. However, what still really matters is the date of putting these measures
into action. (Think for instance of disarmament, or economic policy, or of
the list of environmental topics mentioned in the Introduction.) Thus, at the
heart of an advice will be a date t ≥ t0 = 0 until which the measures should
be put into action by the target group where t0 denotes the present date.
Furthermore, let the advice t be underpinned by arguments, for instance
by speciﬁc results from research work, or by ethical arguments. In any way,
the arguments essentially emphasize the degree of importance and urgency to
become active. Actually the proverb ”it is at the eleventh hour” indicates the
way for mathematical representation: the degree of importance and urgency
will be represented by a point on the clock face, that means by a point on the




2 = 1}. Clockwise
approaching the point (0,1), i.e. 12 o’clock, on S1 represents increasing
urgency and importance up to the emergency case at 12 o’clock.
At ﬁrst glance, the representation of the advice and the underpinning
arguments by a time interval and a point on the clock face respectively might
seem to be somewhat tautologous. However, it is not at all tautologous if
an advice which refers to a date is further underpinned by an argument
emphasizing the importance and the urgency of taking action.
Apparently, this stylization just provides an ordinal ranking of degrees
of urgency and importance rather than a cardinal one. Thus, for instance,
one may remove that part of S1 which lies in the strictly positive quadrant











1 + x2 = 1, x1 ≤ 0 or x2 ≤ 0}
is the (ordinal) scale of importance and urgency expressed by the arguments,
i.e., it represents the arguments (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Space ˜ S1 of Arguments








Clearly, also the advices t can be represented on the unit circle. At
ﬁrst glance this might appear to be somewhat roundabout. However, the
signiﬁcance of this kind of representing advices will turn out in the ﬁnal
result (Proposition 2) of this Section. Actually, it allows for an appealing
generalization and uniﬁcation of the assumptions of Proposition 1.
Let us proceed by taking a second copy of ˜ S1. There is nothing unna-
tural with bounding advices from above by some positive real number T: Ad-
visers a priori do not take advices t > T into consideration, and furthermore
any point of [0,T] has to be a reasonable argument of the decisionmaker’s
reaction function which will be introduced later. Accordingly, let us map the
interval of admissible advices [0,T] onto ˜ S1 by the canonical homeomorphism
τ : [0,T]
≈
− → ˜ S1 ⊂ R2
t 7→ (τ1(t),τ2(t)).
τ maps 0 on (1,0) and T on (0,1) (cf. Figure 2 below).
5For the sake of convience, from now on the points (x,y) of the unit
circle will be represented by their polar coordinates
e
iψ(x,y) := cosψ(x,y) + i sinψ(x,y)
where cosψ(x,y) = x and sinψ(x,y) = y. Following the mathematical con-
vention the angle ψ(x,y) ∈ [0,2π[ denotes the counter-clockwise angle be-
tween the ray of positive reals and the ray from the origin through (x,y) ∈ ˜ S1
(see Figure 2).








T b =(0,1)b =e−i d (3/2)π
eiψ(x,y) = e−ib ψ(x,y)b =(x,y)
Using also the complementary angle
b ψ(x,y) := 2π − ψ(x,y)
one actually has two representations of every point (x,y) ∈ S1 diﬀerent from
(1,0):
eiψ(x,y) = ei[−(2π−ψ(x,y))] = e−ib ψ(x,y)
k k
cosψ(x,y) + i sinψ(x,y) = cos[−(2π − ψ(x,y))] + i sin[−(2π − ψ(x,y))]
This is well-known from the periodicity and symmetry properties of sin and
cos.
6Consequently, the canonical homeomorpism τ can equivalently be rep-
resented by the following mapping:
τ : [0,T]
≈
− → ˜ S1
t 7→ eiψt = e−ib ψt
where the angle functions ψt and b ψ = 2π −ψt are given in the intuitive way:
ψ : [0,T] → [π/2,2π]
t 7→ ψt = ψ(τ(t)) = ψ(τ1(t),τ2(t))
and
b ψ : [0,T] → [0,3/2π]
t 7→ b ψt = 2π − ψ(τ1(t),τ2(t)).
This means, both angle functions are increasing linear functions in advices t:
b ψ(t1+t2) = b ψt1 + b ψt2
and
ψ(t1+t2) = 2π − [(2π − ψt1) + (2π − ψt2)]
= ψt1 + ψt2 − 2π ∀t1,t2 ∈ [0,T] with t1 + t2 ≤ T.
For its intuitive appeal and in order to simplify the notation, henceforth only
the complementary angle function b ψ will be used. Accordingly,
τ(t) = e
−ib ψt.
Furthermore, in the sequel all angles φ which are clockwise measured will be
written as b φ ∈ [0,2π[.
After these preparations the basic hypothesis of the study that the tar-
get group executes a given advice with decreasing delay when the adviser in-
creases his emphasis on the importance and the urgency can be analytically
represented in the following way: consider the Cartesian product ˜ S1 × ˜ S1.
It can be geometrically visualized as a subspace of the torus S1 × S1 (see
Figure 2):
Thus, an argument is represented by a point e−ib ϕ of the ﬁrst factor ˜ S1,
i.e. of the so-called base space of the product ˜ S1 × ˜ S1. Correspondingly, an
advice t is represented through the homeomorphism τ by a point e−ib ψt of the
second factor ˜ S1, i.e. of the ﬁber space over the base point e−ib ϕ.
7Figure 3: The Subspace ˜ S1 × ˜ S1 of the Torus S1 × S1
Given an argument e−ib ϕ from the base space ˜ S1 a delayed reaction
behaviour, i.e. a delayed reaction regime, of the target group is representable
by a continuous reaction function, which may be known or unknown to the
adviser:
(id × rb ϕ) :
©
e−ib ϕª





















b ϕ, b ψt
´
> b ψt for all advices e−ib ψt. (In order to simplify the notation
we omit the b over r
³
b ϕ, b ψt
´
. Thus, throughout the study r
³







b ϕ, b ψt
´
.) Using a continuous reaction function we are in the tradition
of Grunberg and Modigliani.




of an advice e−ib ψt and an underpin-







Of course, in general one has r
³
b ϕ, b ψt
´




is from the bounded interval [0,T], whereas the ultimate outcome is not
bounded from above, i.e. the delay is not restricted.
A ﬁrst introductory example of a delaying reaction function is given
by the ”uniformly σ-delayed reaction function” which for a given argument
e−ib ϕ delays every advice t b =
τ e−ib ψt by the same interval [0,σ (b ϕ)] b = e−i[ σ(b ϕ). In
other words, the whole ﬁber space ˜ S1 over the base point e−ib ϕ is clockwise
rotated by the angle σ (b ϕ). Let us take the convention that an image point
e
−ir(b ϕ,b ψ) ∈ S1 which lies outside the domain ˜ S1 has to be interpreted in the
natural additive way. Actually, the image angle r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
∈ R+ contains the
full information.
According to the basic hypothesis of the study the delay [ σ (b ϕ) must
decrease for increasingly important and urgent arguments b ϕ. Analytically
this can be represented by a continuous mapping from the base space
b σ : ˜ S1 → [0,2π[
e−ib ϕ 7→ [ σ (b ϕ)
which is strictly monotonically decreasing with clockwise increasing argu-






= b σ(1,0) > 0
ensures that b σ really generates a delay.
A simple example for b σ is given by the diﬀerence to the emergency
argument:
b σd : ˜ S1 → [0, 3/2π]
e−ib ϕ 7→ d 3/2π − b ϕ
Now we can state the following
Deﬁnition 2. A function b σ : ˜ S1 → [0,2π[ with the above properties is called
a delay function. Given a delay function b σ the resulting ﬁberwise continuous
reaction function






e−ib ϕ,e−i(b ψ+[ σ(b ϕ))
´
9is called the uniformly σ-delayed reaction function. The term ”ﬁberwise”
characterizes the particular property of rb σ that it leaves all base points e−ib ϕ
unchanged.
Uniformly σ-delayed reaction functions are fairly peculiar. Nevertheless,
we have started our analysis with these functions mainly for the follow-
ing two reasons. (1) They provide a simple formalization of delayed reac-
tion behaviour which furthermore is geometrically intuitive. (2) Besides this
propaedeutical quality the class of uniformly σ-delayed reaction functions in
fact is the germ from which all generalized classes of reaction functions used
in this study will be derived.
Now let us come back to the argument justiﬁcation objective. We will
shorten notation by the following




of an advice e−ib ψ and an underpinning argument e−ib ϕ by which the adviser’s
objective of argument justiﬁcation is achieved. In other words, an accurately
taken advice is a ﬁxed point of the target group’s reaction function.
It is a trivial observation that for a uniformly σ-delayed reaction function














There is a remark in order: it might be argued that taking the set of
ﬁxed points of the reaction function as the set of solutions to the argument
justiﬁcation objective I would unnecessarily restrict the solution set. Indeed,
points of ˜ S1 × ˜ S1 which are ”approximate” ﬁxed points might well qualify
as solutions in a broader sense. However, the following existence results
concerning ﬁxed points also throw light on the broadened solution set of
approximate ﬁxed points: particularly the points of the neighbourhoods of
ﬁxed points are approximate ﬁxed points. This discussion, however, will turn
out to be a special aspect of the more comprehensive analysis of the adviser’s
objectives in Section 3 below.
Evidently, a uniformly σ-delayed reaction function is not very satisfac-
tory as representing real reaction behaviour. Actually, there is no reason why
the target group for a given argument should delay any possible advice by the
same time interval. For instance, one might think instead of a proportional
delay by which, for a given argument, the advices t are delayed the more the
greater is t. But, clearly, also this class of reaction functions is fairly restric-
tive. Looking more closely, it turns out to be a subclass of the class of delayed
reaction functions which is obtained by continuously ﬁberwise deforming the
10functions of the reference-class of the uniformly σ-delayed reaction functions.
The following deﬁnition makes this precise.
Deﬁnition 4. A uniformly σ-delayed reaction function
rb σ : ˜ S
1 × ˜ S
1 → ˜ S
1 × S
1
is continuously ﬁberwise deformed (perturbed) into a ”delayed reaction func-
tion”









if r is a continuous deformation (perturbation) of rb σ i.e. if there is a contin-
uous map (homotopy) R : ˜ S1 × ˜ S1 × [0,1] → ˜ S1 × S1 with R|˜ S1×˜ S1×{0} = rb σ
and R|˜ S1×˜ S1×{1} = r, such that each ﬁber mapping











is a continuous deformation of the corresponding ﬁber mapping
rb σe−ib ϕ = rb σ|{e−ib ϕ}×˜ S1.













> b ψ and r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
≥ 0 for all b ϕ ∈ ˜ S1.
Remark. The last requirement guarantees that r (weakly) satisﬁes the basic
hypothesis and in fact represents a delayed reaction behaviour. According
to the deﬁnition a delayed reaction function r is just a continuous family
of continuous ﬁber mappings re−ib ϕ such that r is homotopic to rb σ and each
ﬁber mapping is generated by continuously perturbing the corresponding
ﬁber mapping rb σe−ib ϕ of the uniformly σ-delayed reaction function rb σ. More-
over, obviously every delay function can be derived from the diﬀerence delay
function b σd by a continuous perturbation. Thus, the Deﬁnition 3 equiva-
lently could have been stated by using only the diﬀerence delay function b σd
as reference function, or ”germ”, of the class of delayed reaction functions.
A preliminary result on the solvability of the argument justiﬁcation objective
is the following
11Proposition 1. Let














b ψ and r
³
d 3/2π, b ψ
´
≤ b ψ for all advices e−ib ψ ∈ ˜ S1. Then for every advice e−ib ψ
there exists at least one argument e
−ib ϕ(b ψ) ∈ ˜ S1 so that the advice e−ib ψ is






is a ﬁberwise ﬁxed point of the reaction function r.
Proof. The boundary properties and the continuity of r again admit the
application of the Intermediate Value Theorem: choose an arbitrary advice




of image points under the family of ﬁber
mappings (re−ib ϕ) for b ϕ running from 0 to d 3/2π. Due to the assumptions the




into R+. Due to the boundary
assumptions the Intermediate Value Theorem applies (cf. Figure 4).








b φ, b ψ
´
Actually, the boundary conditions of Proposition 1 can be signiﬁcantly weak-
ened so that a wide class of reaction functions with a generalized delaying
characteristic obtains for which still the existence of at least one accurately
taken advice can be ensured:
12Corollary (to Proposition 1). Let









be a continuous reaction function with the following property:
b ψ + ρ
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´




∈ ˜ S1 × ˜ S1, and for at least one
advice e−ib ψ0 ∈ ˜ S1 there exists an argument e









b ψ and an argument e















Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 1.
Nevertheless, the assumptions of Proposition 1 can even be generalized with-
out weakening the result. Particularly, the rigid boundary conditions can
be relaxed. This can be done in a unifying and intuitive way by making
essential use of the torus representation of the reaction function. For this,
we ﬁrstly need a preparatory deﬁnition which actually is intimately related
to the uniformly σ-delayed reaction function type of Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 5. The uniform simple twist of the torus is the ﬁberwise contin-
uous self-mapping







−i((b ψ+b π)−b ϕ)
´
Remark. α just twists the torus once in the following geometrically intui-
tive way: at base point e0 the ﬁber {e0}×S1 is clockwise rotated (”delayed”)
by the angle π. Increasing the angle b ϕ of the base point the rotation angle
decreases to zero at the base point e−ib π and then increases into the opposite
direction up to π if b ϕ is increased up to 2π. (Particularly, the set of ﬁxed
points of α is just the whole ﬁber over the base point e−ib π.) Indeed, α is
almost an old friend: if the diﬀerence delay function b σd would have been
deﬁned using b π instead of d 3/2π, α would just be the extension of the reac-
tion function rb σd (cf. Deﬁnition 2) to the whole range of S1 × S1. Thus
it is reasonable to regard α as an extended (to S1 × S1) standard prototype
formalization of delaying reaction behavior.
We are now ready for the generalizing and unifying result which has been
announced above. Particularly, it is desirable to admit more general reaction
13functions than in Proposition 1. Actually, this will be achieved by means
of the mapping α. Roughly speaking, the reaction functions admissible for
Proposition 2 are essentially the identity mapping, or they inherit the twist
characteristic of α. But the twist characteristic is a prototype representation
of delaying reaction behavior.
Proposition 2. Let a continuous ﬁberwise function











b ϕ, b ψ
´
≥ 0 be given which can continuously and ﬁberwise be extended
to a continuous ﬁberwise self-mapping









of the torus with the following properties:
1. ρ0 is a ﬁberwise continuous deformation of the uniform simple twist α,
and
2. ρ0 has no ﬁxed points over base points e−ib ϕ with b ϕ ∈ ]3/2π,2π[ = S1\˜ S1
Then the conclusion of Proposition 1 still holds, i.e. considering ρ as a
reaction function with a generalized delaying characteristic for every advice
e−ib ψ there exists at least one argument e
−ib ϕ(b ψ) such that
³
e
−ib ϕ(b ψ),e−ib ψ
´
is
an accurately taken underpinned advice, i.e. is a ﬁxed point of ρ.
Remark. Correspondingly to the remark after Deﬁnition 4 one could call
the twist α of the torus S1×S1, or rather its restriction to ˜ S1× ˜ S1, the germ
of the class of the generalized reaction functions ρ which are considered in
Proposition 2. Actually one can easily imagine a large variety of intuitive
mappings ρ which qualify for Proposition 2, since everything is playing in
the R3. Since the ﬁnal outcome e
−iρ(b ϕ,b ψ) is not restricted to ˜ S1 (to [0,T])
the use of the torus apparently is reasonable. However, there remains the
question: what do the assumptions (1) and (2) mean economically? Roughly
speaking the answer is that ρ either is essentially the identity mapping or
it inherits the twist characteristic of α. More detailed: By (1) and (2) ρ
is the restriction to ˜ S1 × ˜ S1 of some ﬁberwise continuous perturbation of
the uniform simple twist α which is ﬁxed-point free over base points from
]3π/2,2π[. Consequently, either ρ0|˜ S1×S1 is the identity mapping, and so is ρ, or
14they are both not. In the latter case, from the economic viewpoint one again
can distinguish two sub-cases: either ρ0|˜ S1×S1 and ρ are the identity mapping









× ˜ S1 respectively, or they are both not. In the ﬁrst
case ρ is just a ﬁberwise perturbation of the identity mapping on ˜ S1 × ˜ S1,
or it inherits – as in the general second case – the twist characteristic of the
uniform simple twist α: consider the orbit
n³
e−ib ϕ,e
−i ρ0(b ϕ,b ψ)
´
|b ϕ ∈ S1
o
⊂
S1×S1 of any advice e−ib ψ ∈ ˜ S1 and its projection on the ﬁber space ˜ S1 of the
product ˜ S1× ˜ S1. The assumptions (1) and (2) make sure that this projection
is onto. Moreover, for all b ϕ ∈ S1\˜ S1 = ]3π/2,2π[ the image e
−i ρ0(b ϕ,b ψ) must be
on one side of e−ib ψ, i.e. either ρ
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
is greater than b ψ for all b ϕ ∈ S1\˜ S1,
or it is smaller. On the other hand there are arguments b ϕ1 and b ϕ2 from
˜ S1 such that ρ0
³




b ϕ1, b ψ
´
is equal to, or greater than b ψ, and
ρ
³
b ϕ2, b ψ
´
is equal to, or smaller than b ψ. But this is just the essence of the
twist characteristic of α, and α is the extended prototype formalization of
delaying reaction behavior.
Now let us proceed to the
Proof (of Proposition 2). Let an arbitrary advice e−ib ψ ∈ ˜ S1 be given.




−i ρ0(b ϕ,b ψ)
´
|b ϕ ∈ S1
o
⊂ S1 × S1, is closed and its projection
n
e
−i ρ0(b ϕ,b ψ)|b ϕ ∈ S1
o
on the ﬁber S1 covers the whole S1, i.e., is onto. (It is
even homotopic to the identity mapping of the S1.) From the Intermediate
Value Theorem and the last assumption of Proposition 2 follows that there










∈ ˜ S1× ˜ S1 the mapping ρ0 is identical




is also a ﬁxed point of ρ, i.e. it is an accurately
taken advice.
Analogously to the Corollary to Proposition 1 we have the following obvious
Corollary (to Proposition 2). If assumption (2) in Proposition 2 is re-











3 Utility Maximization by the Adviser
So far, the adviser’s objective of argument justiﬁcation has been analyzed
in isolation from his other objectives addressed in the Introduction. As it
has been pointed out before, the argument justiﬁcation objective together
with the sub-objective of being right with one’s argument forms the social
reputation objective. In addition to that, however, the adviser may also have
a personal self-interest in the ultimate outcome of the subject.
Clearly these diverse objectives are likely to be conﬂicting. A rea-
sonab1e way to represent analytically the simultaneous striving for conﬂicting
objectives is given by maximizing a subjective utility function. This means
the adviser chooses an advice e−ib ϕ and an argument e−ib ψ which maximize his
utility function.
Let us take one point at a time. First, the two sub-objectives of the
social reputation objective shall be balanced with each other through a utility
function. Then the analysis will be extended further to include also the
adviser’s self-interest in the ultimate outcome.
Formally, the two sub-objectives of the reputation objective mean the
following: as it has been pointed out in the previous section, the argument
















−i r(b ϕ,b ψ)
´
.
The sub-objective of being right with one’s argument on the other hand
means to put forward that argument e−ib ϕ1 which one considers the most
probable one. These two sub-objectives are obviously conﬂicting, or incon-
sistent, if and only if there is no ﬁxed point in the ﬁber over the base point




, b ψ ∈ ˜ S1, with r
³
b ϕ1, b ψ
´
= b ψ. (The pro-
blem that the reaction function possibly may be not (completely) known to
the adviser will be dispelled by assuming that in this case r just denotes the
reactions which are expected by the adviser.)
For our formalization below we need a concept of distance between two
points e−ib χ and e−ib ω of S1. Let us take the absolute diﬀerence |b χ − b ω| for
this. (Of course, there is no restriction to angles b χ, b ω to be chosen from the
interval [0,2π[.)
161. A natural ﬁrst formalization of the adviser’s subjective utility function
is provided by





|b ϕ − b ϕ1|,
¯
¯
¯b ψ − r
³










for arbitrary, but ﬁxed, arguments x,y ∈ R+ are decreasing. (In diﬀer-






i, i = 1,2, as usual denotes the ﬁrst partial derivative of uI after the
i-th argument.)
An equivalent representation of the utility function uI can be given by
the commutative diagram of Figure 5. Let us still have a closer look




∈ ˜ S1 × ˜ S1 R 3 uI
³¯ ¯




¯b ψ − r
³











¯b ψ − r
³





at the properties of uI. The symmetry properties of uI just mean that
the direction of deviation of the given argument e−ib ϕ from the favoured
argument e−ib ϕ1 and of the given advice e−ib ψ from the ultimate outcome
e
−i r(b ϕ,b ψ) does not matter, but only the absolute values of the respective
deviations.
17However, it might be the case that the adviser prefers an argument
e−ib ϕ which overstates the importance and urgency, i.e. b ϕ > b ϕ1, to the
argument e−i[b ϕ1−(b ϕ−b ϕ1)] which understates them by the same absolute
value. Or, he may prefer an advice e−ib ψ which is delayed under the
argument e−ib ϕ, i.e. b ψ < r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
, to an advice e−ib χ which would for the
argument e−ib ϕ be exceeded by the target group by the same absolute








. Both motivations appear
to be reasonable for an adviser who strives for avoiding to be held
responsible for having advised carelessly.
On the contrary, however, the adviser may give priority to the opposite
view in order to avoid to make a name for himself as a ”Kassandra”
and to wear out his arguments and advices for the future.
2. Formally, the latter considerations can be taken into account simply by
removing the absolute bars of the arguments of uI. Thus, the following
second formalization of the adviser’s utility function obtains:





b ϕ − b ϕ1, b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´
,
where uII : R × R → R.
(a) Let us now formalize the ﬁrst addressed attitude of ’responsibility
aversion’ by properties of the partial utility functions. In doing
so we apparently have to take care of the fact that if we vary ψ
then only the second argument of uII varies, whereas, if we vary
b ϕ, then the ﬁrst and the second argument of uII vary. Therefore
we formalize responsibility aversion by the following conditions:




b ϕ − b ϕ1, b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´
< u
II (b ϕ − b ϕ1, b χ − r(b ϕ, b χ))
for any e−ib ψ,e−ib χ ∈ ˜ S1 with b ψ > r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
and b χ − r(b ϕ, b χ) =
−
³
b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´
< 0 (cf. Figure 6a).
ii. ﬁxing an arbitrary y ∈ R then uII(x,y) > uII(−x,y) for any
x ∈ R (cf. Figure 6b).
Remark. One might think that it also should be possible to give
a characterization directly by using the angles b ϕ and b ψ. However,
18if one switches from b ϕ > b ϕ1 to 2b ϕ1 − b ϕ(< b ϕ1) which is equally
far distant from b ϕ1, then the total net eﬀect on uII in general




is monotonically increasing with de-
creasing b ϕ ∈ [0, 3/2π]: due to our assumption the switch in the ﬁrst
argument of uII from b ϕ to 2b ϕ1− b ϕ has a decreasing eﬀect. But the
switch from b ϕ to 2b ϕ1− b ϕ also causes a change of the second argu-
ment of uII from b ψ −r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
to b ψ −r
³
2b ϕ1 − b ϕ, b ψ
´
. And due to
i. above this change in the second argument of uII clearly has an
increasing eﬀect when b ψ−r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
> 0 and b ψ−r
³





b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´
(cf. Figure 5, replace b ϕ by 2b ϕ1 − b ϕ).







b ϕ − b ϕ1, b ψ − r
³















(b) The second attitude of Kassandra reputation aversion is analo-
gously formalized by the opposite relations in the above condi-
tions. This is illustrated by Figure 7a,b.
3. So far only the simultaneous striving for the two conﬂicting sub-objec-
tives of the adviser’s social reputation objective has been formalized.
Now, the analytical formalization can be extended further by taking
also into account a potential self-interest of the adviser in the ﬁnal
outcome e
−i r(b ϕ,b ψ).
Taken as an isolated motive the adviser’s self interest will be repre-
sented in a natural way also by a utility function
us : R → R
r
³






b ϕ, b ψ
´´
If, for instance, the adviser is a committed environmentalist, his utility
function us will be decreasing in r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´
. If, on the contrary, he is
biased by the interests of those who will be negatively aﬀected by the
realization of the measures, us will be an increasing function.
19Figure 6: Partial Utility Functions of a Responsibility Averse Adviser
a)
b ψ − r
³








b ψ − r
³
b φ, b ψ
´´
= b χ − r
³





By means of us and the previously given uII an intuitive third formal-
ization of the adviser’s utility function uIII can be provided:













b ϕ − b ϕ1, b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´i
.
Clearly, the partial utility functions uIII(−,y) and uIII(x,−) are to
be taken as increasing functions.
Two reasonable classes of type-III-utility functions shall be mentioned



















b ϕ − b ϕ1, b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´
.

















b ϕ − b ϕ1, b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´´α2
with the positive weights α1 and α2 summing up to +1.
20Figure 7: Partial Utility Functions of a Kassandra Reputation Aversed Ad-
viser
a)
b ψ − r
³









To interpret these two examples, the ﬁrst one allows for a total sub-
stitution of striving for the reputation objective for striving for the
self-interest objective and vice versa, whereas the second multiplicative
Cobb-Douglas-type function does not.
4. The separable utility function uIII, however, turns out to be a special
case of the following generalized fourth formalization uIV :







b ϕ, b ψ
´
, b ϕ − b ϕ1, b ψ − r
³
b ϕ, b ψ
´´
.
The partial utility functions of uIV have already been characterized by
the previous considerations (see Fig. 8).








b φ, b ψ
´
, b φ − b φ1, b ψ − r
³




2 × R × R
³
b φ, b ψ, b φ − b φ1, b ψ − r
³
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